Stalingrad, more than just a victory

When Hitler ordered the start of Operation Barbarossa in late 1941 he expected a quick victory over the Russians and a swift end to the war. It could not be farther from reality. Instead of a swift demise, the Russian army fought back in an unprecedented way. Instead of an orderly retreat, the Russian army destroyed everything in its path that could help the Germans. Farms were burned, railroads were demolished and everything else that would enable a quicker German advance was destroyed. Despite these measures, the German army had little to no problems advancing ever further into Soviet territory. And then they got to Stalingrad. 
The bloodiest battle during the Second World War entered the realm of legend almost as soon as the guns fell quiet. It became the symbol of Russian hope, the military turning point in the war and has held onto that status up to this day.1 The focus has been on the military importance, which cannot be denied, but Stalingrad was much more than a military defeat for the Germans. Hitler could not admit a defeat of the proportions of Stalingrad.2 He and his colleagues had to figure out a way to marginalize the outcome of the battle. It was the first defeat for the German army in years after successful campaigns in Africa, France and Eastern Europe. It had to be downplayed to keep up the war effort and support for the regime. The psychological effect of the battle has often been overlooked and is just as important as the effects it had on the military. What was the impact of the battle of Stalingrad on the propaganda and politics of the Nazi regime?
After the guns fell silent in the city, Germany had lost an entire army and German morale had taken its first blow after years of victorious conquest. However, it was not just a blow to the military morale but also to both the Nazi leadership and ordinary people in Germany. Up until then, the war had been a string of swift victories at low cost and this was reflected in the propaganda. Reports were fairly accurate and factual for a totalitarian state because there was no need to alter the stories, as they were favourable for the regime regardless. Despite these results journalists were warned to be cautious. This was to ensure no unwarranted hopes were raised among the public. Instead of reporting about captures in and around Stalingrad, they were to report about individual soldiers fighting a hard battle. Stalingrad had to look like a fortress which was to be the excuse should the campaign slow down. Despite these cautions, a few months later Hitler ordered preparations for news coverage on a victory that was never to be.3
Quickly after it became clear that victory would not be achieved, the propaganda started to focus on other events, such as the beastlike character of the Soviet Soldier that refused to realize when continuing the fight was pointless or the stalwart resolve of the Nazi Grenadier. Another tactic employed by Goebbels and his men to divert the public's attention away from Stalingrad was simple ignorance. The German press started to report about anything but Stalingrad. After months of headline coverage the battle was relegated to a few lines on the back pages. Despite these precautions, the reports were still far too optimistic and the German newspapers started to lose their valuable connection to the people.4
Hitler himself reinforced this lost connection. When thoughts of a victory had disappeared and the German army was on the defensive, he still claimed a crushing blow had been delivered to Soviet forces and a decision on the eastern front would soon be reached.5 This did not go down well with Goebbels who complained Hitler wasn't seeing the problems he was causing by alienating the public. After that, Nazi propaganda took a sharp turn away from any factual reports and started to become more and more bombastic and vague. It exclaimed that the German people should be up for the tasks ahead; else Germany would be in danger and would possibly face annihilation. 
To emphasize this, Goebbels wrote the following: 'We have thrown our whole national existence into the balance, there is no turning back now'.6 These words proved to be prophetic as they were released just before the Soviet counter offensive days later. From that point onwards the propaganda began to produce even more fantastical and misguided information while concealing facts: Hitler promised gigantic armies marching towards the Eastern front that didn't exist, victories were claimed despite lost battles, the emphasis on the possibility of German annihilation became ever greater, and any detailed information about the war was completely left out as the Soviet army progressed towards Germany.
It can be concluded that Stalingrad was not just a military defeat for the Germans but also a turning point in German morale. Before the events at Stalingrad took place, the press and public was optimistic but soon after it became clear a swift victory would not be achieved, the public quickly became alienated from the information released by the government and with that, from the Nazi party itself. Morale had taken a big hit and would not recover during the remainder of the war despite the enormous efforts by Goebbels and his propaganda department. Stalingrad proved to be more than just a military defeat for the Germans; it was a defeat for the Nazi Party back home as well. 

1 Warren F. Kimball, Stalingrad: A Chance for Choices in, The Journal of Military History, vol. 60, no.1 (January 1996) pp. 89
2 Jay w. Bird, The Myth of Stalingrad in, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 4 no. 3 (July 1969) pp. 187-188
3 Ibidem, pp. 188-190
4 Ibidem, pp. 190
5 Warren F. Kimball, Stalingrad: A Chance for Choices in, The Journal of Military History, vol. 60, no.1 (January 1996) pp. 100-101
6 Jay w. Bird, The Myth of Stalingrad in, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 4 no. 3 (July 1969) pp. 191