Unlike nearly every other advanced economy during the past 25 years, Australia has not had a recession. Not since the short, sharp Keating recession of 1990-91.
Our defences against a recession are now threadbare, in large part because the protection provided by the Great Growth Wall of China has been breached.
In the eyes of global market analysts, Australia's 25 years of benefit from the Chinese economic miracle has rendered Australia an economic colony of China. 
Hence the 9 per cent hit to the value of the Australian stockmarket during the last two weeks, and the fierce 20 per cent correction in the past eight months. The global market treats the Australian Stock Exchange as an adjunct of China's economic fortunes.
The correction on the ASX can be traced directly to Beijing. What is remarkable is the extent to which the Chinese government has replicated the error that triggered the global financial crisis of 2007-08.
The trigger this time, again, is inept government meddling in markets.
In 2007, the culprit was the United States Congress. It wanted to extend the benefits of home ownership to more lower-income families. In so doing it weakened lending standards. It was a bipartisan effort: social engineering by the Democrats and deregulation by the Republicans. It allowed a toxic soup of low-quality loans to boil over.
In 2015, Beijing made a blundering market intervention, unleashed toxic finances, then blundered trying to curb them. This time it was the stockmarket, not real estate.
From 2010 to 2014, the Shanghai Composite Index fell by a third (from 3050 to 2000) while the US stockmarket recovered steadily from the shock of 2008. China's economy was supposedly growing at 7 per cent a year yet its stockmarket was going backwards.
Beijing was not happy. It wanted more wealth creation and more market participation. From   April 2014, it began micro-managing the stockmarket. First, it made foreign investment easier. Then it relaxed the rules on borrowing against share investments.
Then it relaxed the rules on trading accounts, making them easier to open for small investors.
The result was spectacular. In the year to   June 2015, the Shanghai Composite Index rose from 2047 to 5166, a 152 per cent gain.
This did not reflect a surge in the collective health of Chinese companies, or the health of the Chinese economy. It was casino capitalism. The Chinese stockmarket was replicating the mania for gambling among many Chinese, evident in the torrent of money flowing through Macau casinos.
Small investors were trading in and out of stocks, borrowing to invest, and opening multiple trading accounts. It became a self-evident trading bubble.
When prudent investors staged a retreat, inexperienced investors turned it into a stampede. The Shanghai market has plunged 42 per cent in the past six months, to 3000, a return to reality.
The heavy-handed efforts by Chinese authorities to stanch the rout instead created a loss of confidence by the global market in China's ability to manage its markets.
Confidence is hit because the debt-laden Western world has no obvious replacement for Chinese growth. And China has its own debt mountain to manage. Its total public and private debt is equivalent to about 240 per cent of GDP.
The response in Australia has been rational. The $400 billion sell-off on the Australian stockmarket over the past eight months has been a steady correction. Shares on the ASX are now priced at an average multiple of 16 times earnings, almost in line with the historic average.
This orderly correction pales in comparison with the impact of the 2008 crisis. On   November 1, 2007, just before the financial meltdown in New York, the ASX 200 index hit 6873, its all-time high.
During the next two years it would fall to 3111, a plunge of 54 per cent.
More good news: China has just announced its economy grew 6.9 per cent in 2015.
This is a very good number, given the law of large numbers - the inherent difficulty of maintaining high growth rates as an economy or company grows ever bigger.
However, given the events in China of recent months, analysts are becoming increasingly sceptical about the accuracy of Beijing's statistics.
Some have become more than sceptical, such as the Royal Bank of Scotland. On   January 11 it sent clients what became an infamous warning: "Sell everything except high-quality bonds ... In a crowded hall, exit doors are small."
Twitter: Paul_Sheehan_