thoughts on the 50-megaton bomb . Bertrand Russell . all friends of peace have been profoundly shocked and discouraged by the Soviet government &apos;s resumption of tests culminating in the explosion of the 50-megaton bomb . Mr Krushchev maintains that all this is done with a view to preserving peace . this , of course , is nonsense . but it is much to be feared that the west will react by very similar nonsense . on 22 October , four members of the committee of 100 , of whom I was one , delivered a statement signed by the Rev Michael Scott and myself at the Soviet embassy protesting against the explosion of the most powerful nuclear weapon yet tested . somewhat to my surprise , I received a long answer to this statement from Mr Krushchev , very similar to the letter from him to certain labour MPs which was published on 31 October . the statement to me contains the usual mixture of the truth and falsehood which we have learnt to expect from statesmen of either side . its criticisms of the west are , to a considerable extent , justified . its defence of the Soviet government is almost entirely unjustified . Mr Krushchev deplores , I think rightly , the west &apos;s tardiness in agreeing to negotiations about Berlin . he omits to mention that the Russian proposals for solving the Berlin question would involve so great a gain to the Russian side that the west could not be expected to agree . he omits , also , to emphasise that , from the first , the Russian proposals have been backed by military threats . he points out , I think truly , that in a nuclear war Britain would suffer more than either America or Russia , but he is wrong in thinking that this sort of argument promotes pacifism in Britain . he says : we are carrying out experimental blasts and improving our weapons so that mankind may never experience the horrors of nuclear war . exactly the same sort of thing is being said in America . it is scarcely possible to believe that such sentiments are sincere on either side . each side proceeds on the assumption that itself loves peace , but the other side consists of warmongers . each side proceeds on the assumption that itself possesses infinite courage , but that the other side consists of poltroons who can be frightened by bluster . each side &apos;s bluster , in fact , produces bluster on the other side , and brings war nearer . if Mr Krushchev really believes that the explosion of his 50-megaton bomb is going to cause a love of peace in the west , he must possess a far smaller knowledge of human nature than it is easy to suppose credible . all those of us in the west who are working to prevent a nuclear war are reduced almost to despair by the recent atrocious actions of the Soviet government , while , on the contrary , those in the west who desire a nuclear war are encouraged by every crime and folly of which the Soviet government is guilty . Mr Krushchev says : the source of international tension and the arms race is the policy of the western powers . this is only half the truth . if the matters in dispute between east and west are to be settled without war , they must be settled by negotiation , and in the present temper of both sides negotiation can not be successful if conducted by the threat of war . when Mr Krushchev professes that he wishes to avoid the horrors of nuclear war , he is only half sincere . there is something else that he wishes much more , namely the avoidance of the tiniest concession on the part of the Soviet government . there is some reason to fear that a correlative feeling exists in the west . it can not , therefore , be said honestly by either side that it considers nuclear war the worst possible disaster . the last paragraph of Mr Krushchev &apos;s letter advocates general and complete disarmament . the United States information service has issued a pamphlet called freedom from war with a foreword by President Kennedy . the proposals contained in this pamphlet are admirable . so are Mr Krushchev &apos;s proposals for general and complete disarmament . since both sides advocate the same thing , it might be thought that it would be brought about , but no one supposes that it will be , because no one supposes that either side sincerely desires it . certainly the explosion of 50-megaton bombs is not the way to bring it about . there is a simple test which I should suggest to the statesmen of both east and west : when you feel inclined to make a pronouncement , ask yourself whether it differs in any way from a pronouncement by the other side . you are in the habit of saying that the pronouncements of the other side tend to promote war and , if they seem not to , that is only because they are insincere and hypocritical . if your pronouncements and theirs are indistinguishable , can you wonder that they do not find yours convincing ? if war is to be avoided , both sides will have to cease from finding fault with each other , even when the fault-finding is justified , and will have to abandon the language of threats . we shall not be driven to mend our ways by Soviet threats . nor will Russia be driven to mend her ways by threats from our side . threat and counter-threat is not the way to peace . at one time Mr Krushchev seemed to be aware of this . he has forgotten it , and all friends of man must be saddened by his decision to march along the road of folly . but I have been speaking of what we in the west regard as Mr Krushchev &apos;s mistakes . we are much less aware of the mistakes made on our own side , though it would be easy to make a formidable list weighing in the total not much less than 50 megatons . the United States air force association recently published a statement of its policy which is the most terrifying document I have ever read . it leads up to a noble peroration : Soviet aims are both evil and implacable . the people ( i.e the American people ) are willing to work towards , and fight for if necessary , the elimination of communism from the world scene . let the issue be joined . this gives the tone of the whole ferocious document , which amounts to a sentence of death on the human race . it presents the aims of the enormous economic power of the armament industry and the warlike ardour of generals and admirals - the aims , in short , of the armament lobby , one of the most powerful of the lobbies that largely determine the actions of Congress . the greatest danger that we must face now , in this time of very imminent disaster , is that we should give in to these warmongers of the west as the Russians have shown by their recent actions they have succumbed to the warmongers of the east . we must continue to oppose both , to remember that both are guilty of leading us to our present dangerous pass , that both now seem to have the bit in their teeth . we must continue to urge the west - since we can influence only the west - to insist upon negotiation with determination to arrive at a peaceful issue , to refuse to answer provocative acts with provocative acts , to refuse , in fact , to go to war . assumptions of American defence . Kingsley Martin . in this article I want to assess , as far as I can , after talks in the White House , the Pentagon and the state department , the assumptions that lie behind American defence policy . on the surface at least , the present regime differs from its predecessor in not thinking about containing communism or rolling back or fighting a crusade , but in tough , realistic terms about the power struggle between the Soviet Union and the US . whether this makes much real difference in policy I am not sure . it may be no more than a change in presentation . but it means that ideology comes into conversation only as an element of defence . the argument is no longer about a world divided into angels and devils , with unmoral neutrals dithering on the edge of hell . another difference is that in the Kennedy era the generals do not talk about policy in public . there is still to be a fight about this which may be important before long , but for the moment military chiefs protest only in private . the very impressive Secretary of defence , Mr McNamara , has everything very firmly under control , and the Pentagon concentrates on making military sense of the troika of France , Germany and Britain which the US is now attempting to drive in harness . the first assumption was stated in precise military terms the other day by Mr Gilpatric , the deputy Secretary of defence , whose speech , the press was informed , was cleared at the highest level , i.e vetted by the President . the US is stated to be much superior today to the USSR in both nuclear power and the means of delivery . in Mr Gilpatric &apos;s words , Americans have a second strike capability as extensive as what the Soviets can deliver by striking first . therefore we are confident that the Soviets will not provoke a major nuclear conflict . the second assumption is that a private enterprise shelter policy supported by the administration can so limit the number of civilian deaths in a nuclear war that America would be able to rebuild a civilised and democratic society after it . the third assumption is that by building up conventional forces , America can minimise the danger that a nuclear war might begin by accident or misunderstanding or from Soviet failure to realise America &apos;s determination to use her nuclear weapons . the fourth assumption is that West Germany must at all cost be kept as a permanent ally . it is essential to have her agreement about the Berlin settlement , her alliance in a war and her participation in that integrated organisation of the west , which is thought the best hope for western civilisation whether there is a war or not . let me consider these assumptions in order . Mr Gilpatric states that America will be able to maintain progressively larger arms expenditure until Russia is eventually forced to participate with us in a step-by-step programme to guarantee the peace which so many nations earnestly desire . the present defence budget has reached the colossal figure of $47,000 million . Gilpatric did not mention the possibility that one of the motives for Russia &apos;s inexcusable and horrifying series of tests is that she intends to continue poisoning the atmosphere until America is forced to accept Russia &apos;s programme for complete and general disarmament . whether his estimate of Russia &apos;s inferior striking power is correct , I can not of course say ; one hopes that it is better based than the appreciation that led to the Cuban invasion . according to American intelligence reports the number of Soviet intercontinental missiles is not large . the Russians , we are told , mainly rely on those of intermediate range , so that America &apos;s huge and elaborate system of bomber planes , plus her growing fleet of Polaris submarines , would bring Russia down before she could destroy America &apos;s nuclear bases . it is a matter of doubt whether this alleged inferiority of striking power or the conflicts within the communist world , so vividly displayed in the Moscow communist conference , is responsible for Krushchev &apos;s postponement of a date for making a treaty with East Germany . shelter policy is a matter of acute controversy here . the administration does not suggest that shelters can prevent huge casualties from blast and fire , though it flatly contradicts the estimate of some experts who hold that the inevitable fires following a nuclear explosion would destroy all life above and below ground for many times the distance of the blast . as to the inevitable struggle to crowd the shelters if missiles fall , the only solution appears to be that everyone should have a shelter - which is clearly impossible even if the government stops the supply of bogus shelters , now commercially advertised , and insists on the production of cheap and adequate shelters against nuclear rain . 