a defence of the true faith . by Brother Roberts . Mr Barnett reproduces the argument of personal identity amid atomic change . this is sufficiently answered on page 34 of twelve lectures . a remark or two , however , is called for here . he bases the argument on a fallacy to begin with . he says that during the change of a man &apos;s substance from waste and nutrition , his personality undergoes no corresponding change . this is not true . a man of forty feels himself a very different person from what he was at ten . an entire change in the nature of his consciousness takes place in the interval . it is a matter of universal experience , that as years roll by , the ideas change , the tastes change , the character changes , the voice changes , the personal physique changes - everything changes ; and the nature of these changes depends upon circumstances . why ? because the new material introduced into the system in the process of nutrition , is directed into new shapes and forms , according to the activities by which its absorption is guided and determined . if a man goes to sea , his muscles and vital organs , and the bony framework are in continual occupation , and the nutritive elements are consequently more largely made use of , in building up the mechanical parts of his being , than if he stayed at home . send him to college , and you will see a different result . activity of brain is brought into play , to the neglect of the bodily functions ; and the consequence is , the brain monopolises the nutritive supply , and is developed to the detriment of the merely physical powers , the result of which is , that the man is more feeble as a whole than his sea-faring Brother , and has his mind very differently constituted from what it would have been had he been brought up at the plough . Mr Barnett &apos;s assumption , therefore , that the personality undergoes no change with the progress of material substitution , is wrong . it undergoes many changes , but of course he feels himself the same individual , because the impressions originally constituting his individuality are perpetuated , though modified . but let a stroke affect the brain throughout , and obliterate original impressions ( of which there have been cases ) , the person &apos;s individuality vanishes . he forgets who he was , and what he knew , and begins the formation of a new individuality by means of new impressions , should his power to receive new impressions not have been destroyed by the calamity . a case of this sort is within the writer &apos;s experience , where there was a complete lapse of memory , necessitating the re-formation of acquaintance with friends , places , habits and everything . after a while , the second education as quickly disappeared as the first , and the old memories returned . on Mr Barnett &apos;s theory , this was inexplicable . on the theory that the brain thinks by virtue of its organization , it is susceptible of explanation . Mr Barnett denies the transmissibility of qualities . he feels himself compelled to do this , to save his argument on continuous identity ; but in yielding to theoretical exigency , he convicts himself of either ignorance or recklessness . the very argument he relies upon disproves his denial . he says the body changes throughout several times in a man &apos;s life , and at seventy does not contain a single particle of the matter which composed it at seven . now , in view of this , how does Mr Barnett deal with the fact that a person of dark complexion , eating the same food as a person of light complexion , will be dark complexioned till death ? take the colour of the eye and the colour of the hair ; how does he account for the permanence of these organic qualities , except that the original quality is taken up by the succeeding atoms of nutrition ? Mr Barnett &apos;s answer is they assume similar qualities of their own . do they pick up nothing from their predecessors ? if they do not , how is it that the same flour and mutton eaten at the same table will turn to four different conditions as regards colour and organic quality , in four different persons ? is it not the existing organism that determines the use and quality of the new material introduced ? and how could this be , except on the principle of transmission of quality ? Mr Barnett &apos;s answer to this , finally surrenders the whole case against himself . he says they enter into the same relation to the laws of life as those which the old have quitted . precisely , and this applied to the brain , explains continuous identity amid atomic change . whatever impressions or qualities result from the original organization of the brain , are inherited by the new material , taken up by them , transmitted to successors and so on ad infinitum . but destroy the brain altogether , and you destroy the process as much as you destroy the sight of the eye and the hearing of the ear . Mr Barnett can detect nothing but unintelligible nonsense in the proposition that mind is the product of the living brain , and personal identity the sum of its impressions . his objection to it is that if mind be the product of the brain , it would be subject like the brain to the law of atomic change . and so it is , as Mr Barnett will discover , if he reflects but a moment . is it not a fact , that unless we renew our knowledge , the lapse of time will weaken and in the end destroy it ? is there no such thing as getting out of use , and forgetting what one has learnt ? the very power of education lies in the fact that Mr Barnett denies , viz , that the mind is subject to the law of atomic change , and depends for the form of its development upon the forces brought to bear in its guidance . Mr Barnett struggles in vain against the proposition that if the mind be immaterial , its functions ought to be unaffected by the condition of the body . he suggests that it is associated with the material elements of his being on the common basis of life , which unites and affinitises all parts . animal and vegetable substances are amalgamated on this basis , and why not a third , argues Mr Barnett - the immaterial and immortal ? the answer is , nothing is impossible ; but if this is the principle on which the mind is developed in the body , obviously the inversion of the principle must be fatal to it . if life gives , death must take away . when the principle of life is withdrawn , the animal and vegetable elements of man &apos;s being are destroyed , and any third element depending upon the principle of life for its basis , must perish also . Mr Barnett &apos;s argument recoils upon himself . to evade the recoil , he dogmatises on the principle of life . he says life is not the result of organisation , but a principle that operates through organisation . upon this , we have to ask if the life of a dog is not in the same category ? Mr Barnett can not exclude it . a dog is as much God &apos;s handiwork as a man . it depends upon the same laws of respiration and deglutition as those which govern human existence . the Bible says men and beasts are identical in the mode of life and death ( Eccles 3 . 19-20 ) . what then would Mr Barnett do with his definition as applied to a dog ? life is not the result of organization : organization is the medium through which life is manifested . has the dog an immortal principle of life that was antecedent to its organization , and which only manifests itself through its doggish body ? if so , whose principle of life was it before the dog came ? was it the dog &apos;s ? if Mr Barnett will admit that the primitive life-power in all cases is God &apos;s , we might agree with him ; but in admitting this , he must abandon the idea that human lives are separate entities or souls , which may be disembodied and live as conscious beings still . all human life , and all beast and all insect life , are but inspirations from the eternal universal fountain of life , of which the God revealed to Israel is the focal centre and controller . but Mr Barnett &apos;s Platonism , deeply tinctured with the spirit of Greek mythology , teaching the existence of so many separate independent immortal intelligences , prevents him from seeing this . he insists upon three separable compounds as constituting the unity of a human being . if he would define them , the argument might be made more serviceable . body , soul and spirit are his words , quoting from Paul . we submit to Mr Barnett that these words describe aspects of human existence only while a man is alive . this is shown by the fact that they were addressed to and spoken of living men , and that the three aspects expressed are only presented in life . is there a body when man is dissolved in the grave ? is there a soul to that body when all soul is evaporated ? is there a spirit to it when it no longer exists to be animated by a spirit ? it would be curious to know what Mr Barnett understands by soul as distinct from spirit and vice versa . from a common-sense point of view the matter is plain . a man in life presents three aspects cognisant to the understanding . there is ( 1 ) the body , which is the basis of ( 2 ) the life , which develops ( 3 ) the spirit , or mind . a dead man is a body simply ; an idiot is a body with soul or life ; a living man with full possession of mental faculties presents the combination of body , soul , and spirit . when death comes , it destroys this combination . the body returns to the dust , the life returns to God , and the spirit disappears . the resurrection will put all three together again on the glorious basis of incorruptibility . Mr Barnett &apos;s review of scripture arguments on mortality . Mr Barnett next attempts to follow the scriptural argument . he begins by observing that it is a waste of words to argue against the received doctrine of man &apos;s immortality , as if that doctrine implied that man is not mortal . he illustrates his meaning by saying that the dead are dead in some respects and alive in others . if Mr Barnett would define his terms , it would be easier to follow him . what does he mean by death ? has it no inverse reference to life ? do we not derive our idea of death from acquaintance with life . life is a positive phenomenon , and ( in relation to us ) has a beginning ; and the word death has become current to express the cessation of that phenomenon , with which , unfortunately , we are familiar . it is true the word is used with reference to a variety of things , but this only arises from the fact that there is a variety of life . vegetable life gives rise to its use when a plant dies . metaphorical life , as the prosperity of an institution , occasions its use , when prosperity departs and the institution dies . to whatever thing it applies , it expresses the opposite of the life pertaining to it , or that may be conceived as pertaining to it . on this obvious and universal principle , the death of a human being must have inverse reference to the life of a human being . it can not be said that a human being is dead , unless his life as a human being has ceased . it is vain , therefore , for Mr Barnett to get away from the inconsistency of a man being dead and alive at the same time . if a human being continues to live after death , he is not dead . it would not suit the theory to say that the body is dead , because according to the theory the body is never alive , but only inhabited by the real invisible man , on whose withdrawal the body crumbles . Mr Barnett contends for the elasticity of the terms life and death . unfortunately , he does not define what he means . the only elasticity about them is that already indicated , viz , their applications to different kinds of life and death . on this principle , the scriptures quoted by Mr Barnett are perfectly intelligible without involving that violation of first principles on the subject which he wishes to found upon them . 