there was a division of political responsibility between the federal government and the three territorial governments . the federal assembly would consist of thirty-five members , of whom twenty-six would represent the 200,000 Europeans . the 6 million Africans would be represented by six Africans and three Europeans . later amendments of a highly intricate character increased the federal membership to fifty-nine , increased the membership elected almost wholly by the white vote from twenty-six to forty-four and the African representation from nine to fifteen , with the new members elected on white-predominant mixed rolls . it did not take long before the anti-federationists felt their fears were being clearly confirmed . as a concession to these doubts , it was stated that the active principle behind the federation &apos;s racial policies would be , not apartheid , but partnership . this reassuring word was never precisely defined , and has subsequently been treated by almost every African with derision . at the same time the constitution provided for an African affairs board which could appeal direct to the British government against any legislation it regarded as discriminatory . ( twice it did so appeal , against the constitution amendment act and the 1958 electoral bill . both appeals were immediately rejected . ) Africans continued to remember the remark of Sir Godfrey Huggins as Premier of Southern Rhodesia in 1934 : it is time for the people of England to realize that the white man in Africa is not prepared and never will be prepared to accept the African as an equal either socially or politically . they continued to remember that whatever Huggins said about partnership for English consumption , at home he defined it as the sort of partnership that exists between a rider and his horse . the Rhodesian system of partnership , while less crude and blatant than South Africa &apos;s apartheid , meant colour discrimination almost as pervasive and , it was sometimes held , less honest . the white population , one-tenth of the whole , owned half the land ; the franchise was inexorably loaded against the African , pass laws continued , the colour-bar , though legally modified in detail from time to time , remained socially inflexible , the native affairs department governed almost every aspect of African life . what had happened in South Africa after the union of 1912 happened in central Africa after the federation of 1953 : instead of the tolerant elements leavening and liberalizing the whole , the reverse took place , and so far from white opinion mellowing , it hardened . Garfield Todd , the moderately progressive Premier of Southern Rhodesia , was squeezed out of office in 1958 , and the subsequent elections returned the strongly federationist Sir Edgar Whitehead . the federal government replaced the powerfully pro-settler Sir Godfrey Huggins with the even tougher and more determined ex-trade unionist , ex-boxer , ex-engine-driver Sir Roy Welensky who , so far from modifying his determination that the Africans must never dominate the federation , continued to reaffirm it with increasing vigour and confidence . of Sir Roy &apos;s extreme rightism it can only be said that his opponents of the dominion party , which leans towards the South African solution , are even more extreme . in all events , he had a mandate now to press the British government in 1960 for complete independence for an almost exclusively white-controlled federation . physically , it seemed to begin with , federation paid off : business boomed , Salisbury - capital of both Southern Rhodesia and the federation - mushroomed into a significant city . all around , the political storm-clouds grew . the settler community and their spokesmen in London had argued that the African resistance to federation had been based only on prejudice and ignorance , and would disappear as they began to recognize the solid benefits that it brought . precisely the contrary came to pass . the central Africans were by now only too well aware of the yeasty upsurge of nationalist movements all around them , while they remained groping in the stagnant pool . with virtually no practical means of political self-expression , nationalist movements grew inwards upon themselves . in each of the territories the usual African national congress existed . in Southern Rhodesia it had sunk into inactivity , but revived with the emotions against federation . in Northern Rhodesia it was active but divided ; a movement against the congress President , Harry Nkumbula , charged him with softness and tolerance and in 1958 a breakaway group was formed called the Zambia African congress , led by the ex-schoolmaster Kenneth Kaunda . then , as the united national independence party , Mr Kaunda &apos;s group promised independence by October 1960 , which was rash . the potentialities for conflict existed in all three countries , but it was in Nyasaland that the nationalist organization developed its greatest energy . the Nyasaland congress had been formed in 1950 ; the institution of federation three years later provided it with its raison d&apos;&amp;ecirc;tre , and in 1958 it received at last the genuine leadership and stimulation it had awaited . Dr Hastings Banda , after forty years away from his homeland , returned , bursting with vigour , to be instantly elected President of Congress . Dr Banda had been a doctor in north London most of the time , combining the practice of medicine with political campaigning for African causes . for the three years before his return he had been in Ghana . in the summer of 1958 he had a sensationally triumphant return . he brought with him a western education , an African sense of values , a keen sense of political organization and a biting oratorical gift . Hastings Banda had something messianic for the people of Nyasaland . seven months after Dr Banda &apos;s return the first trouble came . fifteen Africans were arrested in February 1959 for holding an unauthorized meeting in the northern province of Nyasaland . the jail in which they were held was attacked by a furious crowd , which succeeded in rescuing them ; a series of riots at once broke out over the province , and federal soldiers were flown into Nyasaland from the Rhodesias to put down the civil disorder . in the clash that followed fifty Africans were killed . trouble swiftly developed into crisis . in Nyasaland a thousand congressmen were arrested - including Dr Banda . the Governor , Sir Robert Armitage , let it be known that the African nationalists had prepared a plot to assassinate the white population . in Southern Rhodesia 500 more were detained ; in Northern Rhodesia thirty-eight Zambia congress leaders were charged with forming a murderous society to prevent Africans from voting in the coming elections . the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia declared a state of emergency , shortly afterwards pronounced the African national congress illegal and legislated for government powers to detain opponents , without charge or trial , for up to five years . even South Africa had up to that time no legislation so drastic . at this point the whole issue forced itself into the British consciousness , and became a matter of major political contention . it grew even more acute when a four-man commission led by Mr Justice Devlin , sent out to investigate the reasons for the upheaval , produced a long report which shocked everyone - except , as it seemed later , the government . the Devlin commission reported a deep and bitter division of opinion separating the government from the people , and that the African population of Nyasaland was almost solid in its profound opposition to federation . while the state of emergency was justified , it added , there was no evidence of anything that could be called a plot . Dr Banda , said the commission , would not have approved any such policy of murder . unnecessary and illegal force had been used in dealing with the disturbances . in the most alarming phrase of all , the report said that the territory of Nyasaland since the declaration of the emergency had become a police state . in the subsequent furious debate in parliament the British government startled the opposition by blandly accepting such parts in the Devlin report that appeared to endorse its policy , and rejecting all parts that were critical . the colonial Secretary , Mr Lennox Boyd , allowed the storm to beat around him . the situation remained unchanged ; Dr Banda and his colleagues remained in prison . a considerable section of British opinion , aware at last of the great potentialities for danger in central Africa , began to view the whole federation with deep uneasiness . Sir Roy Welensky continued to prophecy with confidence that the 1960 conference on the constitutional future of the federation would give him even greater powers . the more clamant element among the Rhodesia settlers , incensed at the growing hostility in Britain , began to talk loudly of secession , of a central African version of the Boston tea-party . the following year the colonial Secretary , Mr Lennox Boyd , finally retired from active politics to the board of his family brewing concern , and was replaced by Iain Macleod . almost at once a sensible difference in the situation emerged . the new approach was cautious but apparent . the Prime Minister led the way with a tour round British Africa , culminating in the union , where he startled the nationalist government by referring to the apartheid policies in fairly critical terms , and spoke of the wind of change that was rising throughout the African continent . it was not an impassioned denunciation , but it was a great deal more than any British government spokesman had done before , and it markedly shifted the whole relationship between the United Kingdom and the repressive administrations in Africa . therefore when the new colonial Secretary himself travelled out to central and east Africa to investigate conditions there , his mission was regarded with a watchful optimism by the African politicians , and an undisguised hostility from the right-wing settlers . the result was a temperate but unmistakable reorientation of the British attitude towards the dependencies in Africa , a realistic conservative adjustment to the wind of change . by the spring of 1960 , when Dr Banda was released , the Nyasalanders &apos; determination was absolute : to secede from the federation , come what may , and form their own independent nation under wholly African control . in this spirit they attended the 1960 conference in London , the outcome of which was surprisingly cordial . an agreement was reached on a constitution which although it fell short of Dr Banda &apos;s desire , did establish an African majority in the legislative council and ministerial rank on the executive council . taking their cue from Dr Banda , the Nyasalanders were unmoved by the arguments that a poor , resourceless , landlocked country like theirs made independence an unreality . Dr Banda has talked of the possibility of another federation , of African creation - of associating his country with Tanganyika , or with Northern Rhodesia . ethnically and politically there could be much justification for this , but two paradoxical difficulties arise : Tanganyika is too poor , and Northern Rhodesia is too rich . Tanganyika &apos;s economic difficulties are almost as great as Nyasaland &apos;s , while Northern Rhodesia &apos;s copper interests are so great that its Europeans would go to serious lengths to preserve the mines from an African administration . the Africans of Northern Rhodesia have nevertheless been stimulated by Dr Banda &apos;s success into a new political activity of their own . divided as the Northern Rhodesians are between Harry Nkumbula &apos;s government-tolerated congress and the more intensely nationalist Zambia group of Kenneth Kaunda , they still have far greater strength than the Africans of Southern Rhodesia . unlike their colleagues of the south , they are permitted - indeed encouraged - to form trades unions , and in spite of continuous opposition from the white labour in the mines , their industrial organization is probably the strongest in African Africa . the independence disasters in the Congo had their immediate and obvious repercussions in the Rhodesias . the settler government of Southern Rhodesia , torn between genuine apprehension of African violence and the nervous satisfaction of having demonstrable reason for tightening legislation , reacted abruptly . Sir Edgar Whitehead and his cabinet felt above all things the necessity to win the elections that had been promised for the following spring , and to do this it seemed necessary to prove to the white electorate its ability to clamp down on upstart Africans and prevent any danger of a Rhodesian Congo . the opposition dominion party , predominantly white-supremacist , was quick to exploit the new racial fears of the Europeans , stimulated by the panic-stories from the European refugees from the Congo . the government &apos;s counter to this was to raise the threat of secession from the federation in an attempt to force the British government into relinquishing its reverse powers of veto - long-unused , but still the Africans &apos; only protection against complete settler rule . 