where this is not possible one has to rely heavily on a stock of past experience plus inferences based thereon , and if there is any carelessness in the marshalling and handling of such material it inevitably shows up in the judgment made about what one is doing . once again we find ourselves discussing the situation in terms of contemplative or speculative knowledge , and it appears that so-called practical knowledge is so successfully hidden behind contemplative knowledge that it can not even poke its head out to claim its own separate existence . of course there remains the capacity itself - the know-how - and , as I have already suggested , one may call this practical knowledge if one likes , but it would be extremely misleading to call this a case of knowledge without observation . this is most definitely not a case where I know without observation what others can only know by observation ( or by being informed ) ; having the knack of doing something does not put me in a position to make , without observation , true statements which others can only make with observation . simply knowing how to write I am a fool on the blackboard , for instance , can not ever put me in a position to say that I am writing I am a fool on the blackboard ( pace Miss Anscombe , intention , pp 81-2 ) . if the line of argument pursued hitherto is correct then it is clear that when I do state that I am writing something on the blackboard my statement will stand or fall with the relevant observational evidence . 3 . so far I have been much concerned to rebut the strong suggestion that what might be described as the carrying out of an intention could be known without observation , but now I want to return to a weaker suggestion which was shelved at an earlier stage . this is the suggestion that what we know without observation are our intentions . one might perhaps concede that neither the driver in my example , nor the man writing on the blackboard in Miss Anscombe &apos;s , could know without observation that their respective intentions were actually being carried out , but one might also claim that in both cases the persons concerned would know what they intended to do and would know this without observation and quite independently of what actually happened . it might be held that to know that we intend a certain action is one thing but to know that we have carried it out quite another . Miss Anscombe is loth to let intention and action drift apart in her discussion , and it is certainly true that traditional discussions have given the concepts a false independence . it indeed needs to be emphasized that actions in the primary sense of the word are necessarily intentional . making a telephone call , for instance , would not be an action under that description unless the performance were intentional , and this means that there is no such act as telephoning which can be conceptually isolated from the intention of telephoning . there are of course some descriptions under which something we do can be unintentional , but their use is derivative . for example , there would be no such thing as unintentional offence unless we had the concept of intended offence in the first place . we should also be wary of the traditional tendency to regard intentions as causal starting points of action , or as being themselves mysterious mental actions . action and intention are certainly not distinct in this sense and it is well to bear in mind the fact that the conceptual inter-relation between them is intimate , but I think we can , without betraying that fact , consider as an independent question whether , and how , we know our own intentions . even though descriptions of actions are normally such that the actions under those descriptions must be intentional , those same descriptions can also be used to refer to performances which are not actions except in a secondary sense . this use of such descriptions is more or less the same as the use we make of them when we humanize natural phenomena in our language . there is no reason why we should not describe the performance of a clever monkey in the appropriate circumstances as telephoning even though we do not regard the performance as constituting an intentional action . this would be telephoning in a secondary sense of the word - telephoning in inverted commas if we like ; we should then be using the word to refer to what was merely the performatory skeleton as it were of the fully-fledged action . now it seems to me that intention is clearly distinguishable from mere performance of this kind , and that there can be cases of the one which are not cases of the other . furthermore it seems to me that we can only speak of an intentional action under a description like telephoning for instance in a case where we have both intention and performance . the bulk of my discussion so far could be regarded as an attempt to stress the importance of performance in action , but now I want to consider intention . I have argued that knowledge of performance , and hence of action , involves observation and inference ; now I want to consider if observation and inference are necessary for us to know that we intend something . consider the difference between saying I do n&apos;t know in answer to the question , do you , on an average , take longer steps left foot forward than right foot forward ? , and the same answer given to the question do you intend to come on this cruise next month ? there is a correct yes or no answer to the first question whether you know that answer or not , but it is otherwise in the second case . in the first case the fact is there waiting to be discovered as it were , but there is no intention of which one is ignorant in the second case . there would be something very odd about saying , perhaps I do indeed intend &amp;hellip; but I do n&apos;t know if I do , or saying he certainly intends , but does n&apos;t know it . it seems that if you do intend , then you must know that you intend , or if you definitely do not intend then you must know that you do n&apos;t . this may seem to carry the implication that the knowledge in question is acquired without observation . the fact , if it be a fact , that I take longer steps left foot forward would not have any bearing on the care with which I might investigate the matter ; I might make my measurements carelessly and get the wrong answer . but where I intend something it seems to be guaranteed that I could not get a wrong answer , so it seems as though we must know our own intentions independently of observation . where a fact , about the length of our strides for example , is only known by observation , others may know the fact before we do and may be in a position to correct our knowledge claims , but this does not seem to be the case with regard to the fact of intention . the point appears to come out very clearly in those cases where we make a decision . here , it seems , I know as soon as I decide on an action that I intend to carry it out , but others could only know this by asking me or watching my subsequent behaviour very carefully ; our sources of information seem clearly different and the difference would seem to be that theirs is derived from my report , or from observation , whereas mine is not . so we have on our hands a very puzzling statement of fact indeed - a statement which one person ( the one who intends ) can know to be true without observation but which another ( others generally ) can only know by observation or from my report . at this point one may begin to doubt if to state one &apos;s intention is to state a fact of any kind , and there certainly are cases where expressions of intention should be regarded as performatives rather than statements of fact . suppose the organiser of a cruise asks me if I intend to come and explains that he must know now since there are others who would like my place if I do n&apos;t go . to answer yes in such a situation would be to give my word - to undertake to be one of the party . but if I am sincere in my undertaking then it will also be a fact that I intend to go unless , or until , I give up the intention . suppose another member of the party hears of a sudden change in my circumstances and asks me is it true that you still intend to come ? then in giving an affirmative answer I should be reassuring him on a question of fact . the interesting point now is that I seem to know what I intend without asking anyone or conducting an observational research , whereas my friend can never be as sure about it as I am without asking me . to dismiss the matter at this stage with the peremptory conclusion that this is the sort of concept intention is would simply be to abandon our philosophical post , so I must sketch in , albeit very briefly , an account in terms of which there is some hope of seeing how the concept of knowledge , applies in cases of intention . intention , I would suggest to begin with , is a term which is applicable when a certain roughly specifiable complex of conditions hold . the concept of intention is in some ways like that of being in debt , for instance . one is not describing a person as doing anything when one says that he intends , or that he owes , something ; we say these things when a number of conditions hold , none of which are themselves described in the respective statements . I owe you if I have bought ( on my own behalf ) something from you not having paid , or finished paying for it , and if the debt has not been otherwise abrogated . the conditions under which one may be said to intend something are not as simple as this , and no doubt the concepts of owing and intending are very different in many other respects . both are similar in that to know that one is in debt is to know that such conditions as I have just mentioned hold , while to know that one intends something is also to know that certain specifiable conditions hold in the case of the intending person . there are two main conditions that must hold if we are to ascribe intention to a person . in the first place he must want something . I am using the word want here in a very wide sense , the breadth of which is indicated by the following selection of instances : I want cake , - to get on , - to win , - to be fair , - to be straightforward , - to be honourable , - to do my duty , - to lead a good life , - to do God &apos;s will , - to get my revenge , - to hurt so-and-so , to give but a sample . controlled desires , wishes , or hopes are not enough , neither is the type of want that is relevant here to be defined in terms of what brings satisfaction . it must be a want such that if a person does want something in the required sense he will , provided one further condition be fulfilled , try to get it . the further , second condition is that he should believe that there is a way of getting what he wants and should have some opinions about what to do in order to succeed . thus , there are two types of explanatory answers that one may give to the question : do you intend ? one may , on the one hand , say something like I want to , but I doubt if I can , in which case it is clear that the first of our conditions holds whereas there is uncertainty about the second . on the other hand , one sometimes says I could go , but I do n&apos;t really want to . here one is sure of the means but lacks the want . 