how to transfer authority . Sir Ivor Jennings discusses problems of newly formed nations . nearly twenty years ago , when D S Senanayake asked me to prepare a draft constitution for consideration by the Ceylonese Ministers , I asked him what sort of constitution he wanted . he replied that he was not very concerned with the details , because what he wanted was a transfer of power from British to Ceylonese Ministers . I have heard that sort of remark several times since . as Dr Hastings Banda said not long ago , it is a question of power . I think this attitude is short-sighted . first , nobody can transfer power , except in a purely legal sense . what is transferred is legal authority , and legal authority does not necessarily confer power . if you have legal authority to knock a man down , you still have to knock him down ; and he may prefer to knock you down . similarly , if a group of nationalists have legal authority to govern , it does not follow that they have the power or capacity to govern . we have a classic example in the Congo . the Belgian King and parliament transferred legal authority to the President and parliament of the Congo ; but within a few weeks there was such anarchy that the united nations had to step in . the machinery of government is complicated and sensitive because it is composed of people , and because it requires the collaboration of people . a host of public servants , civil and military , have to obey orders ; even then , government will not be efficient unless the people as a whole accept leadership loyally and enthusiastically . that is why the transfer of legal authority from British to Asian or African hands has been done as slowly and as cautiously as political conditions make possible . long before the example of the Congo , we learned in India in 1947 that it is possible to move too quickly ; and in India there was no question of the public services breaking down because of the failure to obey orders . it was due to the fact that ordinary people felt a sense of insecurity under the new government . in Africa the danger is even greater . few African leaders have the vast political experience which Nehru and Jinnah had in 1947 . India had been integrated under British rule for nearly 200 years , whereas in Africa political entities are still very young . India had a much larger educated class than Africa has . the Indian public services were by 1947 almost wholly composed of Indians . nationalists are nearly always impatient , and they often think that the British government is being deliberately slow and evasive . but what the colonial office really tries to do is to glide so gently from colonial rule to independence that the machinery of government will go on ticking over as if no fundamental change had taken place . some of the Nigerian leaders came to London in 1953 with the slogan independence in 1956 . the British government refused to fix a date . there was a gradual transfer of authority , first in the regions , then in the federation ; and Nigeria became independent , without fuss or bother , on October 1 , 1960 . my second criticism of Mr Senanayake &apos;s formula about powers is even more important . he overlooked the fact that Ceylon had to be governed not only in the first few years after independence but for all time ; and this raises several questions . there was no doubt that , for at least as long as anybody could foresee , Ceylon would have a revenue sufficient to maintain an efficient government . that revenue came from the export of tea , rubber , and coconuts , and there was no reason to suppose that these industries would disappear . its economy would have to be diversified as its population grew , and capital would be needed to maintain the income from the three plantation crops . even so , it began with the advantage of flourishing industries . there are places in Africa of which this can not be said . I doubt if anybody would have suggested independence for Sierra Leone if diamonds had not been discovered , because diamonds and iron ore make up 70 per cent of its exports . I suppose that Northern Rhodesia could keep going so long as its mining industry was efficiently run . but nobody has yet discovered sufficient natural resources in Nyasaland to enable it to stand on its own feet . there are resources , but they can not in present conditions be exploited , because they are too far from their markets . I know that some politicians think that they can get subsidies from elsewhere . but subsidies which are given out of pure generosity are rare : they are normally given to secure political advantages ; and whether the motive is generous or political there is always a risk of their being withdrawn . what is more , the economic problem raises the political problem . to exploit natural resources , even with well-established industries like the tea plantations of Ceylon , a constant supply of new capital is required . in fact , the coconut industry in Ceylon is going downhill because the trees are growing old and not enough are being replaced with young trees . if there is the slightest fear of political instability the owners , whether local or otherwise , will go on taking as much out of the industry as they can and putting into it as little as they can . in short , political instability leads to economic instability . we have seen that in South Africa , which has ample natural resources . after Sharpeville , in 1960 , investors thought that there was a risk of political instability , with the result that there was a large-scale selling of gold shares in London . they were bought in South Africa , but this involved a large flow of capital out of South Africa which will have serious effects on the economy of the country . nevertheless , the economic problem is part only of the political problem . there is the danger of the fragmentation of parties , so that no party may be able to govern . there is the danger of intrigue or corruption among the politicians . above all , there is the danger that sectional differences may become acute and that politicians will deliberately play on them in order to win votes . these difficulties can be foreseen and they ought to be guarded against . my main criticism of Mr Senanayake &apos;s remark is that the constitutional provisions which foresee and guard against these difficulties are fundamentally important . actually , I did not take his remark too seriously ; it seemed to put responsibility on me for suggesting what the difficulties might be and how they might be met . for the next three months we spent a good deal of time on those problems and eventually produced a draft constitution which was approved , with some modifications , by the Ceylonese Ministers and the British government . it has not been a complete success ; and if I knew then as much about the problems of Ceylon as I do now some of the provisions would have been different . that is a common experience ; but a good deal of knowledge has been accumulated over the past twenty years . what I am sure about is that all the problems which can reasonably be foreseen ought to be solved - in so far as they ever can be solved - before the transfer of authority takes place . in other words , a detailed and permanent constitution ought to be carefully worked out beforehand . each territory has its own problems , but experience does suggest some generalizations . so far , the most successful of the comparatively new members of the commonwealth has been India . it had several advantages which most other countries do not possess : but one of them ought to be specially mentioned . the Indian national congress was a large and well-organized party even in 1947 . it was not just an assembly of politicians hoping for jobs . it had its roots deep in the villages . its strength has carried India through since 1947 . it may break up within the next decade ; but there is a reasonable chance that it will have put democratic government on a firm footing for all time . it has had an experienced and broad-minded leader in Mr Nehru . he has been able to keep down sectional loyalties while at the same time recognizing cultural differences . he has not sought to integrate the different communities : in the conditions of India that would be impossible . he has not even tried to produce a partnership , which is the word generally used in Africa . he has sought , with considerable success , to enable every person , without distinction of race , caste , or creed , to take as large a part in the process of government as his abilities and his interests allowed . I will not say that the government of India has been a model ; but certainly it is the best example so far provided . it is the example to be followed in Africa , and in fact it gives us something of a recipe . first , we must have a constitution which gives full protection to the various interests in the country , however diverse they may be , so as to ensure that they can play a full part in the life of the country . secondly , we must have broad-minded and patriotic leaders who remember that , though they are mortal , the nation is immortal . they have to establish such precedents and to create such conditions that their work can go on long after they are dead . indeed , they have to remember that their successors may have entirely different views on many of the problems that arise . in constitutional terms they have to ask themselves whether the machinery of government will work just as well when their political opponents are in office as it does now , while they are in office . thirdly , we must have a good educational system which gives the young men and women a sense of mission , so that they will spurn the pettinesses of political rivalry and keep in view the larger patriotism . it can be done , but it needs goodwill and hard work . nationalist politics , like every other kind of politics , works itself into slogans , whose repetition pleases those who use them , but which gradually become empty of meaning . Mr Senanayake &apos;s formula transfer of power had become a slogan , though in fact he did work hard to get a united people behind him on a scheme which was a reasonable compromise of competing interests . the transfer of authority in 1948 was smooth and peaceful and the constitution worked well until he died in 1952 and for a few years afterwards . - general overseas service . patterns of government in the new Africa . is a party system possible in Africa ? Sir Ivor Jennings considers some constitutional problems . every country in the commonwealth has adopted , at least at the beginning , the principle of responsible government with adult franchise . provided that the transition from British rule has been well prepared there is a good chance of stable government for the first eight or ten years . experience not only in Asia but also , in the early years , in Canada and Australia , has shown that there may be difficulties . politicians find it easy to agree when the main object is self-government or independence . they find it less easy when independence has been attained . the disagreement may be about policies and it may be about personalities ; often it is about both . there are plenty of disagreements in United Kingdom governments ; but the United Kingdom system differs from that in a newly independent country because the strength of the government rests on the support of a huge party organization . it is virtually impossible to break away and form a new party unless there is a major split right down through the party , and that can happen only over an issue of fundamental importance . on any smaller issue , a dissenting Minister has either to acquiesce and carry on as Minister , or step outside the cabinet and remain in the party as a candid but friendly critic of the administration . in a newly independent country this sort of party organization in depth , bound together by ancient loyalties , can hardly exist . 