this principle , which , it should be noted , requires no objective demonstration , marks Schiller &apos;s advance to an independent position in aesthetic theory . as he argues , whereas important elements of the experience of beauty had been severally declared and championed in recent time , the specific quality of beauty had been fragmented and lost in the process . in its most obvious aspect Schiller &apos;s problem is again one of mediation , now on the grand scale , between the advocates of sensualist and intellectualist aesthetics , between the type of Burke and the type of Baumgarten . Schiller applauds in the former the rejection of conceptual form from the fabric of beauty , and in the latter the reference of beauty , in some sense , to the organization of the higher faculties . Schiller has somehow to vindicate in exact theory his conviction that the beautiful is objective , self-contained , selig in ihm selbst - and that it is also , paradoxically , a reflex of freedom in the percipient . of these two essential attributes , it is the sense of independence , of self-containedness , of objectivity in the beautiful which is of greater moment in Schiller &apos;s feeling , about which he is evidently more excited . it is the aspect in which Schiller brings to bear an aesthetic sensitivity in contrast with Kant &apos;s ingenious aesthetics , and in which , therefore , his more positive individual contribution lies . it is the empirical part of the argument which Schiller is impatient to reach from the very beginning of this correspondence . yet , before he will allow himself to communicate the essence of his own experience of beauty he insists on examining the conditions which make that experience theoretically possible . and , in this area , he vies with Kant in stressing the subjective limits of experience . in the letter of the 18th of February Schiller endorses the major principle of the theoretical philosophy : die Natur steht unter dem Verstandesgesetz . in the later part of the correspondence his main argument rests on assumptions which conflict with this principle . to the degree , however , that Schiller emancipates nature from reason , to the degree that he breaks through the Kantian dogma , as Baumecker asserts with approval , he does so without adequate systematic justification . the special kind of objectivity upon which Schiller hopes to rest his theory is quite capricious by the standards of exact thought from which the argument sets out . the position is that , whereas this claim of objectivity is of extreme interest as evidence of Schiller &apos;s aesthetic consciousness and of his efforts to bring it to terms with his theoretical reflections , he does not in fact substantiate the claim in its more far-reaching implications . besides , it is not in this area that the main advance is made . so that , although this whole series of letters is formally directed towards the establishment of an objective principle of beauty , it is not any direct and brilliant challenge to Kant on this issue which we have to applaud . the valuable and the major part of the theory is subjective in essentials . it has to do firstly , and more particularly , with the conditions in the mind of the percipient which permit the transference of the idea of freedom to the object in appearance , and secondly , and more generally , with the whole concept of aesthetic form as an abstract based upon forms of other orders , preparing a far more sensitive redisposition of the theoretical , moral and aesthetic faculties . these trends , and not the special claim of objectivity , belong to the general evolution of Schiller &apos;s aesthetic philosophy , regarded as a body of doctrine having final coherence and universal validity . if , on the other hand , the Kallias letters are examined as evidence of the interplay of rational and irrational motives , and of contrasting forms of vision and language , in Schiller , then a quite different valuation of the objective principle becomes appropriate . for this principle , to which Schiller subordinates the whole argument in a formal way , may then be seen as the extreme of the tendency to rationalize elements which belong properly to the aesthetic mode of vision . it covers and attempts to legitimate the extrusion of the idea of the anima , of the Person , die Natur - das Wesen des Dinges , from its proper location in unreflective poetic conviction into the alien province of systematic aesthetic philosophy . it appears as an irrational impulse to authorize and to dignify the products of artistic intuition . further , it is precisely this , presumably unconscious , attempt at maximum assimilation to each other of the disparate functions of aesthetic imagination and aesthetic philosophy that perplexes criticism of the Kallias letters . the nai&quot;ve perception of beautiful forms as animated by a personal will , whose expression they are , is explained by Schiller with subtlety and detachment in the earlier letters . yet in the later , empirical part of the argument the perspective changes , analogies become facts , aesthetic configurations become things , having their private essences . and this wholly contrasting , aesthetically valid and systematically untenable vision is adapted and assimilated to the abstract terminology of the strictly logical framework . conceptual myths are generated in the vacuum between philosophical and poetic language . there is a grade of objectivity in Kantian usage which may be more closely defined as ( the assumption of ) a universal subjective necessity in regard to any mental disposition or content . Kant develops this sense of the term , for example , in the final section of the Analytik des Scho&quot;nen : die Notwendigkeit der allgemeinen Beistimmung , die in einem Geschmacksurteile gedacht wird , ist eine subjektive Notwendigkeit , die unter der Voraussetzung eines Gemeinsinnes als objektiv vorgestellt wird . but Schiller is from the outset dissatisfied with this attenuated objectivity , which is the maximum that Kant will allow to aesthetic experience . Schiller &apos;s ambition is to show that a concept of beauty is deducible from a priori principles directly , yet he must admit at an early stage that he is compelled to turn partly to the testimony of experience : in this initial usage objective has more the sense of theoretically cogent ; it points beyond Kant &apos;s pronouncement : die Allgemeinheit des Wohlgefallens wird in einem Geschmacksurteile nur als subjektive vorgestellt , and challenges Kant in the assertion : unter einem Prinzip des Geschmacks wu&quot;rde man einen Grundsatz verstehen , unter dessen Bedingung man den Begriff eines Gegenstandes subsumieren , und alsdann durch einen Schluss herausbringen ko&quot;nnte , dass er scho&quot;n sei . das ist aber schlechterdings unmo&quot;glich . Schiller does not meet directly Kant &apos;s main argument for this view , which is , in essence , that the aesthetic judgement rests on a subjective pleasure , which can not itself be the product of a deduction . indeed , there is already evidence that it is not in this teasing issue of the objective principle , in the sense developed above , that Schiller &apos;s vital concern lies , but rather in the vindication of beauty as a function of the human totality . Schiller is dissatisfied with Kant &apos;s manner of excluding rational form entirely from the province of beauty . he concedes the necessity of a sharp distinction between perfection , logically apprehended , and the beautiful , but considers that Kant &apos;s solution is misguided and impoverishes the idea of beauty : it is here that Schiller &apos;s more valid challenge lies , from the beginning of his Auseinandersetzung mit Kant . here , that is , in aesthetic theory proper . in ethical theory Schiller &apos;s defence of natural feeling against Kantian rigorism is a closely related impulse . significantly , as Schiller now approaches the vital core of his idea , his mode of expression changes . he speaks , for the first time , of that critical insight into the structural relations of the theoretical and aesthetic faculties which is to affect his doctrine so profoundly . although distinct from it in kind , beauty is dependent on a technical structure for its realization : denn eben darin zeigt sich die Scho&quot;nheit in ihrem ho&quot;chsten Glanze , wenn sie die logische Natur ihres Objektes u&quot;berwindet ; und wie kann sie u&quot;berwinden , wo kein Widerstand ist ? at a critical point Schiller passes into metaphor and personification , although at this stage he provides also an equivalent statement in abstract terms : - Die Vollkommenheit ist die Form eines Stoffes , die Scho&quot;nheit , hingegen , ist die Form dieser Vollkommenheit : die sich also gegen die Scho&quot;nheit wie der Stoff zu der Form verha&quot;lt . the appearance of the personal analogy may thus be thought of as a sort of rhetorical stress , but there is already some resemblance to the later invasion of the abstract area by notions of irrational origin . the idea of the conquest of a resistance , for example , is not quite commensurate with the abstract statement . there is a certain irony in the next letter to Ko&quot;rner ( 8th Feb ) , for Schiller reproaches him for tendencies which he is himself to exhibit , although more subtly : or the passage may be read as a self-admonition , in the light of the remark which follows : u&quot;brigens rede ich hier mehr als Kantianer , denn es ist am Ende mo&quot;glich , dass auch meine Theorie von diesem Vorwurfe nicht ganz frei bleibt . for Schiller must sense that there is a rather precarious distinction between Ko&quot;rner &apos;s resort to the concept of unity in the manifold and his own indirect but undeniable import of concepts of reason , which similarly threatens collision with the accepted Kantian pronouncement : das Scho&quot;ne gefa&quot;llt ohne Begriff . by insisting on his objective principle and at the same time allowing himself only such departure from the Kantian philosophy as he may hold compatible with the main dicta of that philosophy , Schiller prescribes for himself a very difficult task , which could only be accomplished , if at all , by the intricate verbal adjustments which in fact he makes in the course of the exposition . for , firstly , as emerges between the lines of his letter of the 8th of February , if the attempt is made to establish objectively a concept of beauty and to legitimate it completely a priori from the nature of reason , then elaborate precautions will be needed so as not to offend against that precept that the beautiful pleases without concept . indeed , for this initial dilemma the only direct resolution would seem to require psychological schemes not then available . if , for example , the second limiting proposition were modified to read : the beautiful pleases without the conscious intrusion of concept , then Schiller &apos;s whole argument would be facilitated in the direction which it takes in any case . the besetting difficulty of the Kantian type of thinking , which Schiller inherits , is the extensive use of analytical schemata which transform mental faculties into virtual entities , which tend to appear as segregated elements standing in an external relationship to each other , and constrained , in the extreme case , into a misleading geometrical symmetry . this tendency is reinforced by the personifying drive in Schiller himself , and runs counter to that important systematic idea which is emerging , that conceptual activity is somehow implicit or submerged in aesthetic experience , without however belonging to the fabric of that experience as it appears in consciousness . since Schiller feels strongly that ( practical ) reason and beauty have some profound kinship , he is impelled to assert this by the most authoritative means known to him , that is , by the deduction a priori , by a demonstration that , in given circumstances , the experience of beauty is a logically predictable consequence of our psychic constitution . but he realizes by both systematic thought and immediate experience that concepts are no part of the experience of beauty : and so , apparently , a hiatus is opened , such that it must seem there is no way of penetrating to the sense of beauty by the alien apparatus of concepts . in what follows Schiller feels his way towards an aesthetic psychology , whose advantage over Kant &apos;s doctrine is that it gives a fuller account of the latitude of the aesthetic vision , which may abstract from the forms of the practical and theoretical faculties , and so derive its own proper symbolical forms . Kant &apos;s aesthetic judgement is but one limitation of the general idea of judgement , which in turn is assigned to an intermediate and subordinate position between the faculties of reason . in Schiller the aesthetic judgement becomes primary in both an emotional and formal sense . it is expanded to include the forms of the rational world , on its own terms . it becomes the focus of totality , concord and freedom . 